

FROM NOTHINGNESS TO GREAT SYMPATHY: CHINESE NON-INTERVENTIONISM FROM BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVES

Shih, Chih-yu

Published online: 7 June 2017

ABSTRACT

The Chinese government and people's disregard for failing governance in other countries is in contrast with its portrayal of good governance as a triumph of the Chinese Communist Party. In cases where this theory–practice contradiction affects neither policy-makers nor their constituencies, something deeper than functional hypocrisy must be behind the apparent desensitization. To understand the government's seeming apathy toward failed states, this study draws lessons from the history of Buddhist thought, and the notion of suffering as the nature of “this world” as opposed to that of “the afterworld.” China can find ways to lessen the contradictions in its non-interventionism through a dialectical relationship between the transcendental cosmology/ontology that favors inaction, and the transcendental epistemology that favors self-strengthening, as required by the particular situation.

The Inconsistency Puzzle

Contradictions between theory and practice are noticeable in the foreign policy of any government, whether it be a hegemonic government, such as that of the United States, or the government of a rising power, such as China. In this paper, the political-philosophical foundations of one particular contradiction in United States' interventionist policy and Chinese non-interventionist policy are explored and compared. Examining differences in political philosophies helps explain why the Chinese understanding of intervention, which is influenced by Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist traditions, usually appears apologetic from the Western perspective. This paper argues that American interventionism, which relies on the Western tradition, is *Lockean* in its selection of targets and *Hobbesian* when enforced. By contrast, Chinese non-interventionism is aligned with the idea of “Dao” (or “Tao”) or “the Way” and can thus justify both transcendental non-action and materialist self-strengthening.

A contradiction between theory and practice is manifested in policies surrounding intervention. This paper focuses specifically on internal contradictions between the principles upon which Washington and Beijing evaluate whether a state should be subjected to intervention. Such principles include very different sets of principles that guide actions toward such states, and the principles that guide how states rule themselves. A realistic view of this kind of contradiction accepts such hypocrisy as easily explained by calculations of national interest (Acharya 2007; Lipson 2007; Krasner 1999). A more complex approach seems justified, however, as foreign policy leaders are typically believed to act with good reason, and at the very least, seek to elicit public

support. In cases where the theory–practice contradiction affects neither policy-makers nor their constituencies, an explanation that is deeper than functional hypocrisy must be behind this apparent desensitization towards failed states.

A loss of sensitivity occurs when individual military interventions, mandated by Washington, do not comply with the human rights norms that the United States purports to adhere to when identifying failed states that require intervention. In fact, United States’ interventions have resulted in massive civilian casualties and have jeopardized the treasures of civilization. This irony has not led to serious self-criticism, however. Similarly, China’s insistence on non-intervention in failed states in order to allow events to unfold spontaneously, contradicts Beijing’s constant appeal for self-strengthening in domestic governance.¹ The Chinese government and people’s disregard for failing governance in other countries is in contrast with the portrayal of good governance as a triumph of the Chinese Communist Party. To understand the apparent apathy toward the failed state, this study relies on the Buddhist notion of suffering as being the nature of “this world,” as opposed to that of “the afterworld.”

If, as is the case, this basic contradiction does not distress those who uphold it politically, or their domestic audience, the contradiction must be perceived as either “natural” or required by the “state of nature.” The subject of humanitarian intervention presents an excellent opportunity to discuss what the “state of nature” is or should be. In other words, intervention appears easily justifiable in cases where such action either restores or improves the state of nature, depending on the theory used. This study argues that the imagined states of nature that desensitize the contradiction in the interventionist policies of the United States are both Lockean and Hobbesian (Ward 2006; Burgess 2002; Hehir 1979; Buchanan 1999). China can also find ways of desensitizing the contradictions in its own non-interventionism through a dialectical relationship between a transcendental cosmology/ontology that favors inaction, and a transcendental epistemology that favors self-strengthening, as required by the individual situation. Dialectics is inspired by Buddhism, which has influenced neo-Confucian ideology in China since the early twentieth century. This last point is the topic of this paper.

Contradiction and the State of Nature

One significant contradiction in United States humanitarian interventionist policy is its militaristic tendency. Militarism appears to have driven the fabrication of evidence, torture of prisoners of war (POWs), and looting of treasures, in addition to unilateral withdrawal before full restoration of order. The existence of separate principles for the rule of the other and of the self detaches militarist intervention from the humanitarianism that prompts such interventions. Here the treatment of other states echoes the idea of Locke, who attributes the failure of the state to its incapacity for democracy and human rights. In the Lockean state of nature, people should be free, equal, and independent (Jahn 2007; Eriksen 2011; Lucinescu 2010). Failure to conform to this standard merits outside intervention. And yet the norms the United States follows to carry out intervention echo Hobbes’ ideas, because intervention occurs through international relations, and international relations theorists generally adopt Hobbesian anarchy.² The double states of nature within and between states as prescribed by Locke and Hobbes are plausibly the mechanisms of thought required to desensitize the contradiction between humanitarianism and militarism.

¹ For a few examples of familiar slogans in the twenty-first century, consider “the view of scientific development” (*kexue fazhan guan*), “do something” (*yousuo zuowei*), “strive for achievement” (*fenfa youwei*), and so on.

² The literature on intervention rarely challenges Hobbes on how the use of his notion of inter-state anarchy can justify, or remove responsibility for, false killing in the process of military intervention. Rather, the literature engages Hobbes primarily on the issue of whether sovereignty can be rightly made subject to humanitarian concerns. For a nearly exceptional engagement in the former case, see Young 2003. In the latter regard, see, for example, Charvet 1997, and Ayoob 2002.

Political thought pertaining to the state of nature exists in the Chinese classics as well as in their modern derivatives. Perhaps the most widely-noted version is the symbiosis of *yin* and *yang*, which refers to the opposite and yet combined characteristics of matter that give rise to each other and that evolve dialectically (Yolles, Frieden and Kemp 2008; Fang 2012; Li 2012). In the philosophy of history, this model supports the cyclical view that harmony and chaos take turns. Cycles are intrinsic to Buddhist belief. Classic Confucian and Daoist thought similarly connect mundane affairs and conditions that are chaotic to an amorphous being, which is pervasive and inexpressible, yet retrievable through learning. For Daoism and Buddhism, the ultimate beings are Dao (or the Way), which equalizes all, and emptiness/nothingness, which transcends all meanings, respectively. For Confucianism, the ultimate being is the kingly way that transcends kinship and space and connects all-under-heaven through benevolence. One shared tenet of all three schools of thought is a combination of self-cultivation and “non-action” (*wuwei*), which allows matters to settle into their harmonious nature (Ames 1985; Goulding 2002).

Transcendence may sometimes require actions that are opposed to meditation to stop the expansion of the power of chaos, however (Pittman 2001). For Confucianism, this is the moment when the civilized world encounters the danger of extinction from barbarian invasion. For Buddhism, it is sympathy for the majority of people who are suffering hardship. Neo-Confucianism is particularly keen on a thinking mechanism that will enable a believer in harmony to learn science exploits, rather than respects nature. Neo-Confucianism relies heavily, first on Buddhism, to construct a formless and nameless subjectivity that encompasses everything through non-action, and second, on an enlightened self-understanding that is no longer subject to the material world. This self-understanding includes acting in Great Compassion (*da bei*) through reform, and self-strengthening in a mundane world, in order to ultimately enlighten the unaware commoners and enhance one’s own spiritual life (Kuah-Pearce 2014).

Neo-Confucianism thus adopts modernity as an intellectual challenge as required by the occasion. The challenge of modernity is reduced to a tentative mode of reform that accommodates contemporariness. Learning from Western institutions (e.g., nationalism, liberalism, socialism) and technology, constitutes modern self-strengthening. Learning is essential for the understanding, engagement, and reform of this world. Consequently, the symbiosis of *yin* and *yang* continues to guide this view of the world (Dellios 2011), and subsequently leads to an apparent contradiction between the ontological acceptance of the world as too transient to be worthy of care, and the simultaneous epistemological endeavor to enlighten commoners through self-strengthening. The former sees no need for intervention, because all things share the same characteristics in their ultimate formless existence. The latter views the mundane world as being in need of transcendence and consequently, of learning, for the purpose of enlightenment. Transcendental enlightenment presumably exempts the population from indulgence in materialism when learning from the West.

Traditional Chinese attitudes bifurcate into two strands: one strand stresses patience and non-action while waiting for chaos to settle down naturally, and the other strand emphasizes self-strengthening to enlighten commoners. Both tendencies are familiar to the Chinese. Together, these two strands desensitize the contradiction caused by the movement between them. Belief in the inevitability of the cycle of harmony and chaos reduces anxiety about the suffering of people elsewhere. The coexistence of an ontology of formless subjectivity and an epistemology of learning desensitizes the contradiction caused by a policy of non-intervention that considers both the failure of others and China’s own improvement as necessitated by the state of nature.

The most important contradiction in China’s non-interventionist policy is between the belief that China must strive for good governance and success by means of heavy intervention by the state in society, and the perception that China should not get involved in failed states and societies elsewhere. Official Chinese sources state that local people must determine local values and institutions (Hu 2005; Hu 2012). External intervention weakens and impairs the local mechanisms required to restore order. Such official indifference reflects the long-held philosophy that harmony and chaos are destined to take turns. Hence, any intervention is in vain, however well-intentioned

or heavily invested. Nevertheless, one essential question remains unanswered: why must China remain in order while others are left in chaos? Two contrasting schools of thought provide the answers.

One answer may be obtained from the common belief in Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, that an amorphous nature of being manifests itself in different forms in the mundane world. Whether successful or failed, governance always eventually reverts to its basic nature. Another answer reminds China of its duty as an agent of enlightenment: that it must contribute to the transcendence of human suffering. For Confucianism, this means harmonizing all-under-heaven, and for Buddhism, Great Compassion for the suffering, who in their state are unable to appreciate the fact that their subjectivity lies in nothingness. Secular engagement is adopted in the latter case to reform the mundane world and improve the learning of the suffering population (Tu 1993; Tan 2008). Only through reform, which safeguards the people from suffering and injustice, can the unenlightened population eventually transcend the forms to achieve real universal being.

However, according to Neo-Confucianism, enlightened subjectivity in appreciation of transcendence should be a precondition for engaging in self-strengthening, which no-one can impose through intervention. The American expectation that China would intervene in Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, and elsewhere has been met with self-justified disapproval from China. In a few cases, though, China has either approved or at least abstained from voting and has allowed United Nations sanctions to be passed under United States' leadership. However, Chinese acquiescence in these cases depended heavily on the consent of the extant legal regime in the target state or on requests made by relevant regional organizations (Huang and Shih 2014). China's adherence to the principle of sovereignty appears to violate the rationale behind the institution of sovereignty in the first place: from the fundamentals of the Westphalia Treaty, it has gradually developed into the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, the task for contemporary neo-Confucians is to think of what they should and could do for China in the face of the suffering of the Chinese population.

Two Discourses on Buddhist Transcendence

The role of Buddhism in contemporary Chinese foreign policy has rarely been acknowledged, because Buddhism has never provided clear principles for international relations, and because the influences of Buddhism on Chinese modernity were already incorporated into the country's historical trajectory before the establishment of the People's Republic of China (Hammerstorm 2012; Tao 2002).³ In actuality, Buddhism has contributed to an understanding and appropriation of modernity in China in ways similar to its approach to Confucianism and Daoism in Vietnam in the latter's encounter with Christianity and modernity (DeVido 2009; McHale 2004; Do 1999). Confucianism and Daoism are conservative with regard to the use of industrial power in the exploitation of nature. Confucianism and Daoism are likewise uncomfortable with the ideas of individualism, rationality, or competition that come with liberal democracy and market capitalism. Modern thinkers in Vietnam and China consulted Buddhists intensively to reorient local intellectuals toward accepting modern technology and institutions. By contrast, Buddhist intervention in the way Japan coped with modernity and the West was extreme, undergirding that country's adoption of imperialism in the 1930s (Sharf 1993; Hesig and Maraldo 1995).

Indigenous access to modernity via Buddhism in East Asia has two aspects. The classic aspect is the shared pursuit of transcendence in Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism over individual mundane concerns about immediate interests. Confucian teachings urge that self-rectification of the learned class serves as a model for people all-under-heaven, so as to harmonize the latter into

³ Nevertheless, Buddhist modernity in China adapts to the context, adopting differing forms and acquiring differing meanings (Borchert 2008).

an orderly state. Daoist teachings deconstruct all immediate interests into meaningless eventuality, with the highest respect for nature already in harmony. Buddhist teachings provide an imagined cycle of life that makes everyday sufferings tolerable and the afterworld a place of emancipation. These three teachings are characteristic of the world view and philosophy of life. Nevertheless, the three teachings were all conceived viewing individuality as a questionable basis for ontological imagination and one that requires transcendence (Fu 1973; Brook 1994). The other aspects of Buddhism, namely, its reformist and critical elements, fit its believers into the mundane world where incessant evolution into varieties is a useful reminder of their actual transient state. This last aspect smoothly connects believers to modernity and its various progressive claims, ideologically, institutionally, and technologically.

Modernity changed the way of life and the rules of political economy. Transcending the dazzling changes in the individual as well as those in national life requires the establishment of an understanding of the principles of modernity. At least two Buddhist approaches are available for the suffering population to rely on, and with which to make sense of their suffering: meditation on experiences and letting go through learning (Watson 2001; Rinpoche 1986; Epstein 1989). The first approach considers suffering the result of false feelings or images induced by materialism. This approach is in line with, although not completely similar to, the Daoist solution of looking beyond, or the Confucian solution of waiting for order to return. The second approach seeks the reason behind modernity, grasps its essence, and even practices its rules, so that modernity is no longer superior, destined, universal, teleological, rational, or Christian. If modernity is reduced to knowledge of this world, the limit of its power breeds the desire for further transcendence. At this transcendent moment, belief in the afterworld becomes appealing once again. Therefore, Buddhism can encourage learning about modernity in a way that Confucianism and Daoism cannot. However, no consensus has been reached among Buddhist thinkers about this approach. The debate of such thinkers reflects the two different states of nature that may have sneaked into the non-interventionist policy of contemporary China.

The debate centers on the state of nature. Chinese Buddhist thinkers believe that the human world is full of suffering, but whether or not this suffering is a violation of the state of nature is debatable. On the one hand, the state of nature is emptiness or nothingness. People of this world should transcend fast-passing attractions to the senses in order to retrieve and return to the enlightened state of nothingness (Kieschnick 2003). On the other hand, the state of nothingness is not the nature of this world. Rather, nothingness is a transcendent place accessible only to those who undergo proper preparation. Accordingly, nothingness can only be reached through hard learning and reform. The latter approach therefore requires epistemological rigor (Wallace 2013). Incidentally, a parallel debate ensued in both Japan and China. The Chinese debate began much earlier, because of China's failure to adopt modernity during its encounter with the West. Neo-Confucianism was desperate for a solution to the inability of Confucianism to acquire modernity without jeopardizing the Confucian sensibility of self-rectification and its concomitant aversion to materialism, which modernity seemed to represent compellingly. In this regard, the Buddhist debate on the attitude toward this world is informative (Ritzinger 2014). Accordingly, the sufferings of the failed state in the twenty-first century appear typical rather than alarming. By comparison, the Japanese debate emerged more recently (Hubbard and Swanson 1997). Ironically, this recent emergence was probably caused by the fact that the seeming success of Japan's modernization project before WWII did not generate sufficient alertness for engaging in critical reflection. The project was also imperialist. Finally, Japan's modernization project incurred criticism from Buddhism in the 1980s, because the philosophy of nothingness was believed to have caused disaster both for Japan and its Asian neighbors during WWII.

The philosophy of nothingness, which legitimized Japan's imperialist pursuit of the World History Standpoint during WWII, argues forcefully that the subjectivity of Japan was nothingness, where all, namely the West and the East, should have co-existed. Although the World History Standpoint dissolved the hierarchy of the West over the East, according to critical Buddhism (Stone

1999a), it also privileged the imagined non-place of Japan as claimed by the philosophy of nothingness, to the effect that both the West and the East could be sacrificed mercilessly in this philosophical annihilation. Moreover, critical Buddhism detects that this privileged place coincides with Japanese Shinto worship of Amaterasu, in the sense that both are about the origin and premises of world history. These principles do not rely on knowledge, experience, or even facts, and together establish an exclusive claim for Japan's superiority. The philosophy of nothingness formulated by Nishida Kitaro is significantly indebted to the Buddhist concept of Zen (Hesig and Maraldo 1995). Clothed with Buddhist thought, soldiers of the imperialist government lost worldly feelings toward the victims of their violence. In short, the sense of responsibility is particularly weak in Zen philosophy. The rules for entering, taking, and destroying a mundane place, as well as getting rid of it, are obscure, or arguably unnecessary. Consequently, the will to annihilate and the will to transcend have become indistinguishable.

Original Enlightenment and Silence in the Chinese Debate

The Chinese debate is of a different nature, because the Chinese authorities during the late Qing and Republican periods were never fully able to group their society and people into any coherent modernization project as Japan did.⁴ The responses were uncoordinated and slow as well as insincere. The suspicion about a perceived materialist (i.e., inferior) Western civilization continued to support the imagined self-respect that was maintained on behalf of the thoroughly demoralized Chinese system. Nevertheless, the consensus was that something had to be done to rescue the nation from perishing completely. The typical formulation, which was first indoctrinated in Zhang Zhidong's "Chinese Essence, Western Practice" (*zhong ti, xi yong*) (Bays 1978), lingered on through the twenty-first century in the very notion of "the China model."⁵ Yet why was a materialist build-up that would eventually be useless necessary in the first place, if these efforts would ultimately be transcended in a state of grand harmony? This concept is especially confusing if "essence" remains in a harmonious world and "practice" involves struggle. This confusion led to the debate on whether essence and practice comprise one thing. Alternatively, essence and practice could be regarded as separate formulations.

The basic difference between essence and practice is the route through which one reaches the state of transcendence. One route is through enlightenment, assuming that the state of transcendence is the state of nature cloaked by all kinds of distractions. Relying on one's own effort is thus critical in retrieving the mind to trace one's origin. Away from the origin, Confucianism and Buddhism appear to be in a state of loss. Learning is important in the modern world. According to the School of Enlightenment, however, the real seed of transcendence is concealed internally. Nevertheless, without being conscious of one's internal source of transcendence, learning in the external world can only lead to loss of direction or rampant materialism (Leung 2008). The state of enlightenment is therefore not related to the external artificial world. Rather, it is ultimately about withdrawal from the external world or from epistemology. Nothingness is the assumed and normatively targeted state of nature. As the targeted state of nature, enlightenment can consciously overcome loss in this world. Likewise, as the assumed state of nature, nothingness enables learning and practice to have a basis, so as to avoid drifting away from the origin (Johnson 2002).

⁴ Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977), an influential critic of Chinese literature and sympathetic to the Kyoto School, firmly believed that China's incapacity for modernization actually reflects an amorphous subjectivity that powerfully protected China from cultural subjugation to Western civilization in ways that Japanese modern thought failed to do. Takeuchi Yoshimi apparently incorporated the desired Shinto spirit into Chineseness (Uhl 2009).

⁵ The debate on the China model has produced a huge literature in both English and China in the twenty-first century. For a reference to the earlier debate on essence and practice (Fewsmith 2011).

The School of Enlightenment believes that essence and practice come from the same mind. The mind is where all reasons and phenomena are generated. Essence and practice are absolutely equal in the context of an individual's learning; yet, the mind is inexpressible, formless, and pervasive. Such an origin is somewhat similar to the formulation of nothingness based on the Kyoto School. For both schools of thought, the mind has no beginning or end and is therefore perpetual. Its original state is one of grand harmony that encompasses all that is transient and permanent. The unity of seeming opposites in the original mind ensures one's capacity to possess all possible knowledge and all necessary functions, and this condition makes Buddhism and science intrinsically compatible (Lopez 2008). With enlightenment, one is allowed to see through the bewildering world and is exempt from being reduced to materialism when learning science. Without enlightenment, learning and practice lead to anxiety, because the population only sees the varieties and differences in passing phenomena and desires to aimlessly pursue more phenomena. The population thus eventually drifts away from the original mind.

Enlightenment can provide the type of creativity that enriches this world and still contributes to transcendence through the presentation of non-materialist modernity. By contrast, science in itself can never be the route to reaching the transcendent mind. The phenomenon and the cosmology therefore belong to two distinct levels. Self-rectification is essential in moving an individual from pre-enlightenment to enlightenment. Sheer learning cannot suffice, however, because it will confuse the mind. As the Sage acquires scientific learning, the subjectivity of China as a nation will be saved. At such an important moment of revival, commoners would see how it might be possible for China, which now possesses the power of science and technology, to use such knowledge in a non-violent, non-exploitative, and non-expansionist manner (Jacques 2009). Demonstration of transcendent modernity should further enlighten the West; and this makes neo-Confucianism a categorically different norm from the Buddhist-informed World History Standpoint of imperialist Japan. Nevertheless, this neo-Confucian philosophy, which has become popular again in the twenty-first century, is heavily indebted to Buddhist engagement with modernity.

Practice and essence are not two separate processes. Instead, creativity and retrieval are two sides of the one coin. The same mind therefore has two doors: one open to the transient world and the other open to the transcendent world (Billoud 2011; Chan 2011). The first door opens the way for neo-Confucianism to acquire the enlightening message on the importance of improving one's standing in this world, where Chinese and Western knowledge are seen as similar in terms of their common belonging to the transient world. Something significant emerges in the transient world in this formulation. The Confucian Sage has to rely on self-subduing (*ziwo kanxian*) before the transient world in order to speak to and save the suffering commoners and the world.⁶ The Sage has to learn scientific knowledge in order to germinate the seed of enlightenment in the consciousness of the masses. Despite the exclusion of science from the transcendent world, the Buddhist notion of Great Compassion inspired neo-Confucianism to take the long route of scientific learning to retrieve the origin.

In sum, Buddhist thought inspired neo-Confucianism in at least four different ways in specific regard to the latter's adaption to modernity. First, Buddhism provided the Confucian Sage with an imagined link to a pervasive universe where self-rectification required by Confucianism acquired a broad scope of influence, such that a constantly self-rectified Sage is no longer only a model to be emulated by others, but also the mind of the universe in claiming an all-encompassing spirit. This condition means that the Sage can actively engage with this world and present himself in science and democracy. Second, Buddhism provided both the notion of "transcendent origin" and that of "this world," so that accessing this world through learning science does not affect the capacity for transcendence, and might even enhance such capacity if the Sage decides to engage

⁶ Sub-negation is the popular translation of the notion of *ziwo kanxian*. Self-subduing, however, better connotes the Sage's decision to momentarily sacrifice his transcendence for the sake of awakening the population (Angle 2009; Chan 2008).

with this world. Third, the Great Compassion that Buddhism exhibits to commoners transformed society into a modern state, which is a legitimate goal in Confucianism. Nevertheless, the paramount duty of the Sage is the retrieval of the mind in order to transcend the limit of the self and its materialist pursuits. Without a constantly rectified self, learning is useless if not harmful. Lastly, the achievement of Buddhist enlightenment ultimately lies in everyone's own minds, where the hierarchical value in Confucianism is reconciled with the egalitarianism sanctioned by modernity.

In contrast to the School of Enlightenment, the School of Silence in China adopts a similar strategy to that which was later used by critical Buddhism to deconstruct the philosophy of nothingness (Hubbard and Swanson 1997; Heine 2001; Stone 1999a). The School of Silence worries that practice will corrupt the mind if essence and practice are symbiotic, as alleged by Enlightenment scholars. Critical Buddhism interprets the relationship as one that signifies totalitarianism, which coincides with nothingness. Contrary to the idea of Enlightenment, the School of Silence argues that no nature in the original state is enlightened, because the duty of transcendence is only possible after knowledge of this world is learned. The pursuit of knowledge in this world breaks silence and thus makes silence thinkable. Essence and practice have to be separate to preserve the incorruptibility of essence for transcendence. Reaching such essence is the step that follows learning, rather than the first step before learning. Knowledge of this world can enlighten commoners to the need for reform and germinate the seed of transcendence outside this world. On this particular point, the School of Silence was the harbinger for the emergence of critical Buddhism. Both are wary of the likelihood that nothingness promotes unilateralism. For neo-Confucianism, however, the enlightened state exists in every human being. Silence thinkers did not believe in any universal enlightenment that could take over individual sites and facilitate transcendence.

Silence thinkers emphasize authentic Indian Buddhism (Yuan 1989) and contend that it used to be reform-oriented, considering that commoners constituted a significant portion of the believers. However, Buddhism exported to China was primarily the religion of the well-to-do, whose interpretation turned it into conservative thought. Despite the evolution of neo-Confucianism toward self-strengthening, the learning of the Enlightenment thinkers eventually corrupted the mind and extinguished the seed of transcendence in the self-involving elite. Silence thinkers engaged in knowledge-based reform of the world based on knowledge. Learning is a critical component in Silence thinking (Stone 1999b). The mind is able to grasp the rules of this world by accepting Western science and modernity. Rationality and truth come not from the mind, but from breaking up incorrect knowledge and proceeding to behavioral adjustment that leads to reform. Although this attitude toward knowledge and science is conducive to the need for self-strengthening, neo-Confucianism is hostile toward Silence thinking. For Confucianism, the ultimate task is the restoration of the Chinese nation and the mind's control of science. By contrast, Silence thinking questions the existing order and encourages reform. Learning is perceived as a necessary evil for Enlightenment thinking and a necessary good for Silence.

In sum, the incorporation of modernity into one's life should not be the end of learning. Modernity is a means of achieving transcendence, albeit in different sequences, depending on the school of thought adopted. For the School of Enlightenment, transcendence is the original and ontological state to be restored, whereas for the School of Silence, transcendence is a desired ontology to be accessed by crossing the divide between essence and practice. The epistemological function of learning is therefore necessary for the School of Silence, but not for the School of Enlightenment. For the latter, learning is important because Enlightenment is the guarantee that neo-Confucianism can save the Chinese nation via learning, but without being absorbed by materialism.

Enlightened Non-interventionism and Transcendent Modernity

Understanding China's reservations about the restoration of order in failed states and the aggressive concern for China's own state of governance, requires a level of appreciation deeper than that provided by the usual interpretations embedded in mainstream international relations theory. If China were a typical state that practiced self-help under anarchy, it would not have adhered to a rigid principle, regardless of the suffering of the failed state's population or its own national interest (Pang 2009). Buddhism considers suffering to be a characteristic of this world that reduces failed states to normalcy. According to the School of Enlightenment point of view, transcendence cannot be achieved by merely engaging with this world. Neo-Confucianism's re-appropriation of enlightenment to make sense of learning acknowledges the possibility and rationale of learning. However, learning is futile if the mind is not consciously prepared to be in transcendental unity with heaven (Tu 2001; Yu 2002). The Sage can decide to reach commoners out of his Great Compassion for their suffering by displaying his scientific learning and engagement with modernity. Unfortunately, neo-Confucianism's predilection toward learning has not prescribed any scientific method for commoners (Chan 1957; Needham 1991). In addition, the return to the original mind is ultimately the duty of commoners. This thought could have been the political barrier to China's adoption of interventionism; Great Compassion provided no method, and the local mind of the failed state's leadership could not be made ready by China for the transcendental purpose.

China's own fate was the paramount concern of both neo-Confucianism and Buddhism (Xue Yu 2005). However, the thinking about the original silence that urged scientific learning by all means alienated neo-Confucianism. The School of Silence did not contribute to the contemporary interventionist tendency of the global governance regime, because it was critical of the injustice or lack of equality in its spirit. This spirit of reform fell outside the scope of global governance, which sought a top-down re-establishment of order. The Silence thinkers were likewise critical of the indiscriminate application of rules that ignored reality. Knowledge of local conditions was presumed to be more important than the liberal values dominating most global governance regimes. Despite its rational pursuit of knowledge of this world, Silence thinking fell on the deaf ears of neo-Confucianism. The latter dreads the assumption that no transcendence exists in the original state and frowns at the belief that transcendence can be reached through reform and re-ordering, informed by a correct grasp of the materialist world.

In a nutshell, the political thought that served as the foundation of China's self-strengthening, originated from the apprehension of neo-Confucianism of a perceived reality constituted by the decline of the Chinese nation, the breakdown of traditional Confucian values, and the failure of the Sage's teaching on harmony and self-rectification. Neo-Confucianism lacks a link to modernity that can make sense of the materialist pursuit that seemingly prevails under modernity. Buddhist Enlightenment thinking inspired neo-Confucianism to envision a route toward modernity, because Enlightenment thinkers believe in the original state of transcendence and contend that learning can continue without losing control of the mind. In the traditional Confucian state of nature, self-rectification is the only correct way of life. In the past, although self-strengthening involved physical training, it did not encourage materialism. In the Enlightenment state of nature, modernity is unnecessary and intervention in failed states where the mind is lost is particularly unwise. Modification through Great Compassion allows neo-Confucianism to re-appropriate enlightenment for its pursuit of modernity. In the Silence state of nature, knowledge is the foundation for finding the route to transcendence, and intervention is only proper if knowledge, rather than value, is acquired. No-one can achieve transcendence on behalf of the local population in need of correct knowledge.

From the perspective of Chinese political thought, American interventionism does not come from enlightened self-understanding embedded in transcendence, because of its inherent and value-laden teleology that seeks to transform anything local. Rather, the American call for intervention appears to stem from a mundane desire for material dominance and is a source of chaos in itself. China invariably finds evidence to support this impression in the Hobbesian style of unrestrained

military force and abuse adopted by the United States in its interventions, which are undoubtedly parallel to barbarian invasions. This situation prompts a reaction in the form of calls for self-strengthening, which the Chinese have come to accept as their duty, so that China may serve as a lesson to the rest of the world. Neo-Confucianism intends to prove that power politics can be transcended and that harmony can be restored. However, for other countries, learning must come from self-understanding of internal conditions. Pushing learning from outside destroys the route of return to the mind, which ensures that learning does not proceed for the sake of learning itself. This caution against intervention applies to Enlightenment, which begins with the restoration of the local subjectivity/mind, as well as to Silence, which embarks on the acquisition of localized knowledge and localized behavioral adaptation. The same caution can be used to criticize China on the rise, though, where materialist power is seen to subdue the mind of the Chinese authorities.⁷

The national implication of the return to mind at the individual level is most obvious in China's emphasis on always finding solutions to problems through abiding by national conditions. As long as one believes that enlightenment is possible only via return to the mind, intervention is, by all means, a false prescription. China's appeal for respect for national conditions to justify both the rejection of external intervention in China and the avoidance of China's intervention in other countries' domestic politics has become common. For instance, a Chinese diplomatic message from the Arabian delegation states:

In today's world, changes are turning the heaven and the earth upside down. Whatever ism, system, model, or line one takes has to pass the test of time and practice. Tens of thousands of varieties exist between the national conditions of each country. There is no such thing in the world as the best, omnipotent, and synchronic model of development. There is at best the road of development fittest to the national conditions of the country. (Wang 2012)

The Chinese consciously appeal to traditional political thought when viewing the world. The Daoist notions ("tiptoes do not sustain long standing, big steps do not sustain long walking, self-referencing does not sustain far sight, self-righting does not sustain reasons, self-exaggerating does not sustain achievement, and self-promoting does not sustain leadership") cited by Chinese international relations watchers follow the track of neo-Confucian Enlightenment (Zhang 2014). Another Daoist insight, "strong things turn old" was utilized as a disincentive for stretching over borders. Various mundane strategic concerns, side products, and windfall profits could be conceived by a specific portion of the policy circle each time. However, the reasonableness of non-intervention is the long-held belief.

The rationale behind each of China's decisions on non-intervention, or the use of intervention in a particular manner, differs according to context. The literature cites the Bible of Change (Yi Jing) as saying that "the excited dragon regrets" (flying too high to keep on) to caution against the wish to expand influence. Despite the inconsistency of the policy of non-intervention in certain situations, such as in Somalia in 1992 and in East Timor in 1999, the two cases that China painstakingly explained as exceptional upon giving consent, China has deliberately tied its own hands by discursively ruining the legitimacy of China becoming interventionist in the future. The constant return to classic wisdom conveys two messages: that China has to become stronger and that China has to avoid stretching. For mainstream thought on international relations, the entire point of becoming strong is to expand. Accordingly, Chinese non-interventionism, together with alleged self-restraint, must be logically incompatible.

⁷ This leads to the adoption of the strategy of shaming by the self-perceived victim of China, as during the 2014 maritime dispute, for example. Le Hong Hiep (2014) concludes on behalf of Vietnam that "the most important thing Vietnam can do now is to name and shame China internationally."

Western versus Buddhist States of Nature

Western critiques that usually see Chinese non-interventionism as theoretically culpable and practically laughable can be broken down into two major categories: normative and scientific. The normative category points to China's lack of sympathy for the suffering of people in need of help under the circumstances of civil war, suppression, and incapacity to supply basic needs. The scientific category attends to the strategic calculus of China's non-involvement to reflect at best the very mundane interests pursued by everyone else. The two types of critiques overlap in the observation that China relies on local corruption and dictatorships to promote its own interests. China's rebuttal of normative criticism is rather relaxed and conveys the simple message that intervention would eventually be useless if local conditions cannot breed a local resolution. The Chinese Academy of Social Science presents the typical Chinese logic of non-intervention, not as lack of care, but as one of appealing to national conditions. This is why China should seriously consider the limits of even its own experiences for the rest of the world.

China's support for Africa to choose its own road of development reflects the most sincere attitude. China has never pointed to Africa one direction or another as for its choice of political system. Neither has China determined its close relationship with Africa according to the ideological position. Some African countries suggest to "look to the East" or to learn the Chinese "model of development." China is willing to exchange governing experiences with them while indicating that the most important lesson of choosing the road of development should be to fit in one's own national conditions. China's modesty is seemingly incomprehensible to the Western countries, but is increasingly appreciated among the African countries. By adhering to the principle of non-interventionism, China stands on the reason. (Wang 2012)

The politics of global governance accordingly see one state of nature as opposing another state of nature. The American vision of the state of nature emphasizes equality, freedom, and the independence of individuals. In Chinese Confucian thought, the state of nature involves chaos and harmony spontaneously taking turns in accordance with the Way and, in Buddhist thought, either Enlightenment or Silence. Intervention is unnecessary and would be harmful if the local mind or local knowledge is not present to exercise transcendence. The Chinese approach to investing in local infrastructure, and the ruling elites' well-being, embodies the principle of non-intervention in the hope that, eventually, the elites' capacity to act with tolerance and affect material improvement will restore the general order. China has shown its willingness to facilitate negotiation between local rivals. Considering that the philosophy of harmony opposes division, China typically receives disputing parties in turns in Beijing in order to create an atmosphere for peaceful settlement.

Non-intervention in human rights violations points to a weak conception of human rights from the perspective of the Lockean state of nature. From the perspective of the Hobbesian state of nature, non-intervention amounts to an alliance between the non-intervening state and the target state. Both traditions are important references in the consciousness of Western intellectuals. The West regards Chinese non-intervention with anxiety; from its human rights perspective, China constitutes a failed state (Tull 2008; Hodel 2008). China could also ally itself with those states that, according to US interventionist policy, should rightly be treated as an enemy within an anarchical international system (Karlsson 2011). In such an intellectual environment, a political thought that explains the rationale of Chinese non-interventionism equals an apologist's excuse for negligence of humanity.

Scientific criticism focuses on the structural imperative for China to adopt non-interventionism, regardless of the value, policy, or principle by which China abides. Such presumably factual criticism contends that non-intervention is not an act arising from any transcendent wish, but is a reflection of sheer incapacity to compete with the West or pursue

national interest at the expense of local human rights (Osondu 2013; Chazziza and Goldman 2014; Lagerkvist 2012; Taylor 2006). Scientific criticism is perhaps asking too much, however. The impact of political thought is rarely on the immediate policy choice. Rather, it is an orientation to either motivate in a certain direction or constrain the range of options. The political belief shifts the population's focus away from specific concerns and distracts them. Both China's self-strengthening cycles in modern and contemporary history and Chinese leaders' reiteration that a rising China will not turn into a hegemonic power, are statements of transcendence; a rising power under firm control of the mind looks beyond the materialist world. If such a wish for transcendence does not show consistently in China's alleged non-interventionism because of immediate urgency, complication, or interlude of sheer opportunism, it will still show in the aftermath that renounces certain interests or power gains to reify transcendence over materialism.

The fact is that China can still intervene under various guises, assist in Western intervention in a soft and harmonious manner, and remain acquiescent about selected interventions while being critical of others. In most of the situations where China decides not to intervene, the domestic policy debate nevertheless hears pro-intervention positions that are at least considered legitimate if not eventually accepted. Despite China's effort to remain discursively consistent, the incapacity of ontological and epistemological standpoints to either directly guide *ex ante* policymaking or provide useful *ex post* explanations of policy behavior, is apparent. This incapacity makes the mainstream international relations theory of power and interest particularly attractive to those who view China's non-interventionism as hypocritical and the Buddhist interpretation as apologist. However, the power of scientific explanation should and can still be extended to situations where policy assessment proceeds in the aftermath, to reveal any earlier act of intervention as inconsistent and ultimately reluctant. How a particular notion of national interest is invoked, re-invoked, and revoked in policymaking is not the concern of the current international relations theory that looks exclusively for consistency.

For a student of international relations theory, selecting non-intervention or revoking an act of intervention, is usually seen to be based on considerations of national interest, even though the initiation of intervention could be simultaneously inspired by normative concerns. The Buddhist perspective that explains how an act of intervention is revoked, even though remaining interventionist, is presumably more in line with the national interest. International relations theories need to explain situations where remaining interventionist and keeping out are both reasonable, depending on how national interests are calculated. More specifically, the question of how non-intervention remains a reasonable option for Chinese foreign policymakers calls for an answer such that intervention will always demand painstaking justification. The School of Silence, along with critical Buddhism, undergirds the suspicion that intervention is in danger of resulting in over-involvement, because materialism may ruin the alternative route to transcendence. In response to the Western criticism of China renouncing the responsibility to protect its people suffering from human rights deterioration, the prevailing suspicion among Chinese commentators is almost always about the purpose of Western intervention infamously becoming reduced to the materialism of power and interest.

Enlightenment and Silence refer to entirely opposite formulations of the state of nature, but both are suspicious of Western intervention. For Enlightenment thinkers, local subjectivity has to be the premise of any reform. Western intervention that installs local leadership in a culturally-estranged institution would easily fail such subjectivity, without which the return to mind could not proceed and materialism would follow. For the School of Silence, reform and knowledge are intrinsic to the capacity of transcendence. Hegemonic intervention to enforce norms of global governance defies the possibility of local knowledge, which is the foundation for reflection upon the materialist world. Buddhist thought on the state of nature thus makes non-intervention a permanently legitimate policy position. It will similarly keep alive a critical and self-critical component to cope with any country's intervention on any pretext. In short, non-intervention is a naturally provided policy, but it does not always prevail. The point is not how it fails to constrain

intervention at a particular point, but how non-intervention is a constantly available and intuitively proper alternative as well as a critical perspective to be incurred, regardless of wherever and by whom intervention occurs.

Non-interventionism is therefore not entirely non-interventional. It proceeds in internal and external cycles. On the one hand, the cycle is composed of great sympathy, reform, and opportunism, which are all epistemological, and can either be Enlightenment- or Silence-oriented. On the other hand, it also involves patience, withdrawal, and restoration of local subjectivity, which reflect ontological premises embedded in the original as well as the desired transcendence. According to the School of Enlightenment, one can go ahead with learning modernity only after retrieving the ontologically original state of Enlightenment. In comparison, the School of Silence urges learning, because breaking silence is the only route to establishing a transcendent ontology of silence. Likewise, interventionism is never entirely interventional; thus, all acts of intervention are also cyclical. Militarist intervention and cold-blooded withdrawal call for the Hobbesian state of nature to make sense. These perspectives are in contrast with the Lockean state of nature that prompts intervention.

Conclusion: Practicing Buddhism without Being Aware

On May 4, 2014, the memorial day of the May 4th Movement of 1919, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech on “The Core Value of Socialism” in Peking University. The May 4th Movement symbolizes China’s quest for modernity taking place in an anti-Confucian discourse. Later generations have found solid Confucian strings in the movement wishing for the substitution of modernity by Confucianism. In his speech, Xi not only reiterated the spirit of the movement—patriotism, progress, democracy, and science—but also cited all kinds of Confucian values from Confucian classics. Interestingly, he then enumerated the three Buddhist transcendental stages, namely, seeing mountains as mountains, seeing mountains as non-mountains, and seeing mountains again as mountains. The second stage is the transformational stage in which the mind is no longer affected by the outside world. The third stage refers to the transcendental stage in which the mind enjoys, but is raised beyond, the outside world. Xi further encouraged students to rely on the values which the Chinese population “practices without the consciousness of practicing them” (*yong er bu jue*).⁸ The last remark relates to the third stage and is therefore parallel to Enlightenment discourse, where the core values of socialism cannot lie in socialism, because it is still the consciously applied slogan in the official language. The unconsciousness of using values naturally in daily life connects this world to a transcendental mind no longer entangled with materialism or socialism. “Buddhism” was not mentioned in Xi’s remarks, making Buddhism a completely hidden perspective.

Hope for self-transformation and aversion to other-transformation can coexist among Chinese without causing anxiety. The pursuit of transcendence prepares the Chinese to hold the self-image that their self-transformation will not fall into materialism and that other-transformation cannot help but be materialistic. Ironically, once the principle of non-intervention confirms the mind of transcendence, intervention could become acceptable again. This line of thinking can be further applied to the mounting calls for Chinese intervention. These calls take place in the global governance agenda, and China’s unease about intervention will probably be reduced in the future. Nevertheless, intervention could be very harmful to the pursuit of transcendence over materialism, such that Chinese leaders, academics, and the media consciously resort to Enlightenment thinking as a self-reminder against interventionism. The hidden but powerful Buddhist influence in the Chinese state of nature ironically restricts any sophisticated review or revision of the Western criticism of non-interventionism.

⁸ He actually used the Buddhist dictum to express a form of Confucian advice, because he meant to urge all to adhere to each’s value, without being affected by circumstances (Xi 2014).

* *Chih-yu Shih (PhD)*

University Chair Professor / National Chair Professor

Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University

REFERENCES

- Acharya, Amitav. 2007. "State Sovereignty After 9/11: Disorganized Hypocrisy." *Political Studies* 55 (2): 274-296.
- Ames, Roger T. 1985. "The Common Ground of Self-cultivation in Classical Taoism and Confucianism." *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 17 (1-2): 65-97.
- Angle, Stephen C. 2009. *Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. 2002. "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty." *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6 (1): 81-102.
- Bays, Daniel H. 1978. *China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895-1909*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Billoud, Sébastien. 2011. *Think Through Confucian Modernity: A Study of Mou Zongsan's Moral Metaphysics*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
- Borchrt, Thomas. 2008. "Worry for the Dai Nation: Sipsongpannā, Chinese Modernity, and the Problems of Buddhist Modernism." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67 (1): 107-142.
- Brook, Timothy. 1994. "Rethinking Syncretism: The Unity of the Three Teachings and Their Joint Worship in Late-imperial China." *Journal of Chinese Religion* 21 (1): 13-44.
- Buchanan, Allen. 1999. "Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7 (1): 71-87.
- Burgess, J. Peter. 2002. "Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: The Circle Closes." *Security Dialogue* 33 (3): 261-264.
- Chan, N. Serina. 2011. *The Thought of Mou Zongsan*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
- Chan, Wing-Cheuk. 2008. "On Mou Zongsan's Idealist Confucianism." In *Confucian Ethnics in Retrospect and Prospect*, edited by Qingsong Shen and Kwong-loi Shun, 171-184. Washington D. C.: The Council for Research in Value and Philosophy.
- Chan, Wing-Tsit. 1957. "Neo-Confucianism and Chinese Scientific Thought." *Philosophy East and West* 6 (4): 309-332.
- Charvet, John. 1997. "The Idea of State Sovereignty and the Right of Humanitarian Intervention." *International Political Science Review* 18 (1): 39-48.
- Chaziza, Mordechai, and Ogen S. Goldman. 2004. "Revisiting China's Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate Wars." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7 (1): 1-27.
- Dellios, Rosita. 2011. "International Relations Theory and Chinese Philosophy." In *Chinese Engagements: Regional Issues with Global Implications*, edited by Brett McCormick and Jonathan H. Ping, 63-93. Robina, Qld: Bond University Press.
- DeVido, Elise A. 2009. "The Influence of Chinese Master Taixu on Buddhism in Vietnam." *Journal of Global Buddhism* 10: 413-458.
- Do, Thien. 1999. "The Quest for Enlightenment and Cultural Identity: Buddhism in Contemporary Vietnam." In *Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia*, edited by Ian Harris, 254-283. London: Pinter.
- Epstein, Mark. 1989. "Forms of Emptiness: Psychodynamic, Meditative and Clinical Perspectives." *The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology* 21 (1): 61-71.
- Eriksen, Stein S. 2011. "State Failure' in Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the Contradictions of State Formation." *Review of International Studies* 37 (1): 229-247.
- Fang, Tony. 2012. "Ying Yang: A New Perspective on Culture." *Management and Organization Review* 8 (1): 25-50.
- Fewsmith, Joseph. 2011. "Debating 'the China Model'." *China Leadership Monitor* 35. Accessed May 22, 2014. <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM35JF.pdf>.

- Fu, Charles Wei-hsun. 1973. "Morality or Beyond: The Neo-Confucian Confrontation with Mahāyāna Buddhism." *Philosophy East and West* 23 (3): 375-396.
- Goulding, Jay. 2002. "Three Teachings Are One": The Ethical Intertwinings of Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism." In *The Examined Life—Chinese Perspectives: Essays on Chinese Ethical Traditions*, edited by Xinyan Jiang, 249-278. Binghamton, N.Y.: Global.
- Hammerstorm, Erik. 2012. "Science and Buddhist Modernism in Early 20th Century China: The Life and Works of Wang Xiaoxu 王小徐." *Journal of Chinese Religion* 39: 1-32.
- Hehir, J. Bryan. 1979. "The Ethnics of Non-intervention: Two Traditions." In *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Principles and Applications*, edited by Peter G. Brown and Douglas Maclean, 121-139. Lexington: Lexington.
- Heine, Steven. 2001. "After the Storm: Matsumoto Shirō's Transition from 'Critical Buddhism' to 'Critical Theology'." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 28 (1-2): 133-146.
- Hesig, James, and John Maraldo, eds. 1995. *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Hiep, Le Hong. 2014. "Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: What Should Vietnam Do." *The National Interest*, May 15. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinese-assertiveness-the-south-china-sea-what-should-10468>.
- Hodel, Mike. 2008. "The Scramble for Energy: China's Oil Investment in Africa." *The Journal of International Policy Solutions* 9: 50-54.
- Hu, Jintao. 2005. "Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity." Speech by president of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations Summit, New York, September 15.
- . 2012. "Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China." Speech by general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the 18th Party Congress, Beijing, November 8.
- Huang, Chiung-chiu, and Chih-yu Shih. 2014. *Harmonious Intervention: China's Quest for Relational Security*. Surrey: Ashgate.
- Hubbard, Jamie, and Paul Loren Swanson, eds. 1997. *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism*. Honolulu: Hawaii University Press.
- Jacques, Martin. 2009. *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*. New York: Penguin.
- Jahn, Beate. 2007. "The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1 (1): 87-106.
- Johnson, Ina. 2002. "The Application of Buddhism Principles to Lifelong Learning." *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 21 (2): 99-114.
- Karlsson, Krister. 2011. *China & Peacekeeping: Contributions to UN Peace Operations from 2000-2010 and the Theory of Offensive Realism*. Minor Field Study Report. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
- Kieschnick, John. 2003. *The Impact of Buddhism on Chinese Material Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kuah-Pearce, Khun Eng. 2014. "Understanding Suffering and Giving Compassion: The Reach of Socially Engaged Buddhism into China." *Anthropology & Medicine* 21 (1): 27-42.
- Lagerkvist, Johan. 2012. "China's New Flexibility on Foreign Intervention: Seeking Global Clout, China's Position on Sanctity of Sovereignty Evolves." *YaleGlobal Online*, May 29. <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-new-flexibility-foreign-intervention>.
- Leung, Kwok. 2008. "Chinese Culture, Modernization and International Business." *International Business Review* 17 (2): 184-187.

- Li, Peter Ping. 2012. "Toward an Integrative Framework of Indigenous Research: The Geocentric Implications of Yin-Yang Balance." *Asian Pacific Journal of Management* 29 (4): 849-872.
- Lipson, Michael. 2007. "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy." *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (1): 5-34.
- Lopez, Donald S., Jr. 2008. *Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lucinescu, Alexandru. 2010. "Humanitarian Intervention, Sovereignty and the UN Charter in the International Liberal Order 3.0." *Journal of East European & Asian Studies* 1 (3): 401-418.
- McHale, Shawn. 2004. *Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Needham, Joseph. 1991. *Science and Civilisation in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Osondu, Adaora. 2013. "Off and On: China's Principle of Non-Interference in Africa." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science* 4 (3): 225-234.
- Pang, Zhongying. 2009. "China's Non-Intervention Question." *Global Responsibility to Protect* 1 (2): 237-252.
- Pittman, Don Alvin. 2001. *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii press.
- Rinpocije, Kalij. 1986. *The Dharma*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ritzinger, Justin R. 2014. "The Awakening of Faith in Anarchism: A Forgotten Chapter in the Chinese Buddhist Encounter with Modernity." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 15 (2): 224-243.
- Sharf, Robert H. 1993. "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism." *History of Religions* 33 (1): 1-43.
- Stone, Jacqueline. 1999a. "Some Reflections on Critical Buddhism Jacqueline." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 26 (1-2): 159-188.
- . 1999b. *Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii press.
- Tan, Sor Hoon. 2008. "Modernizing Confucianism and 'new Confucianism'." In *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Chinese Culture*, edited by Kam Louie, 135-154. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tao, Jiang. 2002. "A Buddhist Scheme for Engaging Modern Science: The Case of Taixu." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 29 (4): 533-552.
- Taylor, Ian. 2006. "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa." *International Affairs* 82 (5): 937-959.
- Tu, Wei-ming. 1993. *Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- . 2001. "The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World." *Daedalus* 130 (4): 243-264.
- Tull, Dennis M. 2008. "China in Africa: European Perceptions and Responses to the Chinese Challenge." *SAIS Working Papers in African Studies*. Washington D. C.: African Studies Program, The Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School Advanced International Studies.
- Uhl, Christian. 2009. "Displacing Japan: Takeuchi Yoshimi's Lu Xun in Light of Nishida's Philosophy, and Vice Versa." *Positions* 17 (1): 207-237.
- Wallace, B. Alan. 2013. "Introduction: Buddhism and Science—Breaking down the Barriers." In *Buddhism & Science: Breaking New Ground*, edited by B. Alan Wallace, 1-30. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Wang, Zefei. 2012. "Sticking with Non-intervention in Internal Politics, China would not be Beaten on Reason (in Chinese)." Last modified April 27.
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/zfgxdfzc/t926892.htm>.
- Ward, Lee. 2006. "Locke on the Moral Basis of International Relations." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 691-705.
- Watson, Gay. 2001. *The Resonance of Emptiness: A Buddhist Inspiration for a Contemporary Psychotherapy*. Delhi: Jainendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra.
- Xi, Jinping. 2014. "The Core Value of Socialism." Last modified May 5.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-05/05/c_1110528066.htm.
- Xue Yu. 2005. *Buddhism, War, and Nationalism: Chinese Monks in the Struggles Against Japanese Aggression, 1931-1945*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Yolles, Maurice, Graham Kemp, and B. Roy Frieden. 2008. "Toward a Formal Theory of Socioculture: A Yin-yang Information-based Theory of Social Change." *Kybernetes* 37 (7): 850-909.
- Young, Iris Marion. 2003. "The Logic of Masculinist Protection on the Current Security State." *Signs* 29 (1): 1-25.
- Yu, Jiyan. 2002. "Xiong Shili's Metaphysics of Virtue." In *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*, edited by Chung-ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, 127-146. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Yuan, Chuan-wei. 1989. "Indian Studies in Modern China (1900-1989)." *China Report* 25 (2): 175-180.
- Zhang, Lihua. 2014. "Chinese Views of Traditional Cultural Value and National Identities (in Chinese)." Last modified January 8. <http://www.rwwhw.com/Rjwh/Mzsj/2014-01-08/11811.html>.