ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO EQUALITY IN ZHUANGZI: AN ASIAN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the possibility of an Asian feminist reading of the Zhuangzi as a way of appropriating Asian religious and cultural resources for the liberation of women and men. Through a close reading of Zhuangzi’s “discussion about equalizing things” in its original language, it explores alternative paths to equality suggested in the Daoist wisdom tradition. Zhuangzi’s subversive wisdom, characterized by radical pluralism based on the respect for difference and otherness, and by an alternative identity politics based on interdependence and mutual transformation between things, provides an alternative to the collectivism rooted in the Confucian tradition and to the individualism rooted in modern Western thought, both of which reflect hierarchical worldviews that create the dichotomy of the subject/self/human and the object/other/nature and marginalize “the Other,” including women.

Introduction

This article will explore the possibility of an Asian feminist reading of the Zhuangzi as a way of appropriating Asian religious and cultural resources for the liberation of women and men. It is well known that Confucianism has a reputation for its degrading attitude toward women, and its hierarchical worldview has influenced people’s attitudes and behavior in many parts of Asia as it was the dominant ideology underlying the basic structure of society for most of two thousand years. In response to this Asian reality, in which collectivism rooted in the Confucian tradition has served hierarchical structures of power and has been instrumental in women’s subordination, feminism, based on the individualism rooted in modern Western thought which focuses on women’s independence, has been adopted as an alternative for Asian women’s movements. However, both the collectivism rooted in the Confucian tradition and the individualism rooted in modern Western thought share identity politics based on a view of universal humanity as a male property, and on an essentialist view of a “fixed” identity, which justifies ontological difference between men and women and thus the distinction of their roles.

It is at this point that we need to turn to a counter-tradition within Asian religious and cultural resources such as Daoism for an alternative strategy. Therefore, I will explore how Zhuangzi’s subversive wisdom can provide an alternative both to the Confucian and to the modern Western frames of identity politics and worldviews. Through reading Zhuangzi’s “discussion about equalizing things,” which is the second chapter of the Zhuangzi, and which contains the core of his philosophy, I will explore an alternative identity politics based on interdependence and mutual transformation, which deconstructs the dichotomy of the
subject/self/human and the object/other/nature. As this project deals with ancient classical texts, the issue of authorship and hermeneutical problems will be discussed to begin with.

**Authorship and Hermeneutical Problems**

**Authorship**

With regard to the production of the text of Zhuangzi, we can surmise that a significant part of the writing of the text would in all probability have been done by Zhuangzi himself (Coutinho 2004, 21). In terms of the figure of Zhuangzi (ca. 375–275 BCE), it is noteworthy that he was born in the village of Meng (蒙), which was located in the southernmost part of Song (宋) in the “borderlands” between Song and Chu (楚), between the central plains and the south. Thus, the borderlands provide the “liminal” setting for the development of Zhuangzi’s particular liminal style of Daoist thinking (27).

The book of Zhuangzi itself contains stories about its author, which provide an invaluable source of information about him. These are “portraits” of Zhuangzi created by his followers to “embody” his teachings; this is not historical information, but information about how Zhuangzi was remembered/presented by his followers in the text. These anecdotes give a vivid impression of an impoverished character living in a wretched state, residing in a small alley, and weaving sandals for a living. At one point he becomes so desperate that he is forced to beg for food, albeit unsuccessfully, from the Marquis of Jianhe (22).

A recurrent theme in these stories is Zhuangzi’s disdain for power. When a ruler offers him a high position, Zhuangzi says that he would rather drag himself through the mud; when Hui Shi is afraid that Zhuangzi will take his place as chief minister, Zhuangzi tells his friend that the position is worth nothing more than a rotting rat (Zhuangzi, ch. 17). These stories, in which the character portrayed is very much in keeping with the company of outcasts in the book, surely reflect the ideals the master taught and embodied, regardless of their historical factuality. He was an unconventional, bohemian figure surviving on the borders, negotiating his way through the interstices of an organized, structured world, aware of its contingency and fragility (Coutinho 2004, 23-24).

About the figure of Zhuangzi, we also find another record from Sima Qian (司馬遷: 145–86 BCE), the Grand Historian of the Han dynasty. In his “biography” of Zhuangzi, Sima Qian (1959) says, “His saying surpassed all bounds and followed his whims. Therefore the men in power could not utilize him” (2144 quoted in Møllgaard 2007, 11). This record of Sima Qian reflects the spirit of Zhuangzi as a radical critique of power (Billeter 1996, 876-77). The early testimony is sparse, but we gather these essential facts about Zhuangzi: he is unique and unclassifiable; he is one of those remarkable people who are liberated from things; his use of language is astonishing and disconcerting; and he puts forward a critique of power so radical that it cannot be assimilated by the tradition (Møllgaard 2007, 11).

Concerning the authorship of the book, we need to consider that the Chinese approach to authorship has been very different from that of the modern West. The writer to whom a Chinese text is attributed is not necessarily a single individual who is the creator and owner of the ideas. The emergence of a text is a cooperative production that often continues after the death of the “author” and that may start before the contribution of the particular individual to whom the text is attributed. Much of the text attributed to Zhuangzi, for example, was produced long after the death of Zhuangzi. Hence, scholars such as Liu Xiaogan (1994) and A. C. Graham (2001) have concerned themselves with the problem of classifying the thirty-three chapters of Zhuangzi according to the schools that produced them (27-29).

Despite some differences of opinion, there is a great deal of agreement with regard to the classification of the major portions of the text. It is generally agreed that the historical Zhuangzi
was in all probability the author of the first seven chapters, the “Inner Chapters,” while the rest, divided into the Outer (8-22) and Miscellaneous Chapters (23-33), which contains some texts that are consistent with and in cases develop and elucidate the thought of the “Inner Chapters” as well as some texts that are deemed inconsistent with them (Møllgaard 2007, 12), are taken to have been written by followers and others, from the time of his death to at least the founding of the Qin empire (Coutinho 2004, 35). Thus the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters provide an interpretive context for the “Inner Chapters” (37). The thirty-three chapters of the Zhuangzi extant today were edited by Guo Xiang (郭象). According to Jean Francois Billeter (2002), Guo Xiang’s commentary transformed Zhuangzi’s thought of radical autonomy into an apology for disengagement that served the Chinese literati’s conservatism (133). The emphasis on harmony and adaptation in recent Western aesthetic-pragmatic interpretations of Zhuangzi is in line with this traditional Chinese view (Møllgaard 2007, 12-13).

Hermeneutical Problems

As interest in Zhuangzi grows in the West, interpretations of the Zhuangzi begin to compete, each apparently attempting to demonstrate what Zhuangzi really thought and believed, what he rejected, and what he was really trying to do. Some say that Zhuangzi was a “relativist”; others, that he was actually some kind of skeptic, perhaps a “methodological skeptic” or a “linguistic skeptic”; still others, that Zhuangzi was an “anti-Rationalist” who rejected “Reason” (Coutinho 2004, 38). Such rival claims concerning the real meaning of the text, based on the naive idea that there can be a single correct meaning, point to the problem of interpretation. The question is whether it is appropriate to impose such historically conditioned presuppositions based on Western philosophical concepts on an explicitly open and polysemic text written by an ancient Chinese thinker in a different historical, cultural and textual context (39).

To say that the Zhuangzi is an open and polysemic text does not mean that the text can be read to say anything you want it to say. In the same way, it is only with a dualistic, dichotomous, all or nothing attitude that skepticism and radical relativism appear to be the only alternatives to a naïve realism that seeks some fixed and determinate original meaning (40). Rather, a text like the Zhuangzi, in which the world is understood as process in constant change, points to a pluralist attitude that meaning is multivalent, indeterminate, always in process of construction, open to possibilities of change, and replete with contradictions and inconsistencies. While there are always criteria to which one can appeal in order to justify one’s interpretation, such as historical sensitivity, linguistic sensitivity, closeness to the text, coherence, and so on, these criteria arise from our situatedness, for language, culture, and history are not simply given, but are themselves part of what is to be interpreted (41, 43).

The plausibility of an interpretation is ultimately a matter of recognition that is immediate and intuitive (41-42), and requires an act of genius that parallels the genius of the author. Thus, all interpretations are always provisional and awaiting further refinement or revision, just as our situatedness and recognition are always provisional and open to further change and development. The faithful reading of a text produces not a recapturing of ideas and experiences from the past, but an exploration of ideas and experiences yet to emerge in the life of the interpreter, as Paul Ricoeur (1981) notes: “Henceforth, to understand is to understand oneself in front of the text. It is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self” (143).

Hence, interpretation is a process of experiencing meaning through the interaction between the text, the author, and the reader in their respective situatedness, rather than a result of the reader’s discovering the original meaning that the author intended through the text, as the text, once written, remains outside of the author’s control and has its autonomy as the site of the interactive conversation or play between the author and the reader (Coutinho 2004, 55). One can
intend to say something, and can succeed in saying what one intends, but what one cannot do is to control and contain all possible understandings of what one says. Indeed, one cannot know with complete closure all the ramifications, implications, associations, and development of what one has said (59).

It seems that Zhuangzi is aware of the indeterminacy of meaning, as manifested in his treatment of language (言), when he explicitly says that he himself is not sure if he has really said something with what he has just said: “Now I have just said something, but I don’t know whether what I have said has really said something or whether it hasn’t said something.” (今我則已有謂矣, 而未知吾所謂之其果有謂乎, 其果無謂乎? Zhuangzi, ch. 2, 齊物論) For Zhuangzi language (言) is an unknown, for language or saying always hovers in-between saying something and saying nothing, and so maintains an indeterminacy and openness in relation to that which it speaks about (Møllgaard 2007, 70): “Saying (言) is not just the blowing (of the wind); saying says something. It is only that what it says is not fixed. Is there really saying then? Or has there never been saying?” (夫言非吹也. 言者有言, 其所言者特未定也. 果有言邪? 其未嘗有言邪? ch. 2, 齊物論) For Zhuangzi, it is precisely because what saying (言) says is never fixed and settled (定) and signification is indeterminate, that authentic saying open to the reality of constant change is possible (72).

The Zhuangzi is a text that acknowledges its own openness, and this radical openness fits into Zhuangzi’s deconstructive, unconventional, and subversive way of understanding the world. As an open text, the Zhuangzi also encourages the reader/interpreter to participate in its weaving of meanings through intertextuality—the interaction between texts within the book, both in the context of its authorship and in the mind of the reader, where a piece of the text interprets another and vice versa endlessly, creating a banquet of meanings like the harmony of the sounds of myriad differences made by the interactions between the wind and the holes of pipes in Zhuangzi’s metaphor.

Qi Wu Lun (齊物論): Discussion about Equalizing Things

The second chapter, 齊物論, is the most complex and intricate of the chapters of the Zhuangzi, containing rich theories that point to the core of Zhuangzi’s philosophy (牟宗三 1963, 196). The chapter opens with the theme of “loss of self” in a dialogue between Master ZiQi from the south wall (南郭子綦) and Yan Cheng Zi-You (顏成子游). Here the location of the speakers needs to be noted. The south outer-wall is a plebeian district, if not a ghetto, since the center of the city is occupied by upper class people (Wu and Zhuangzi 1990, 154). Seeing Master ZiQi “falling apart as if he has lost the counterpart of himself,” Yan asks, and the Master answers:

What is this!? Can the body really become like withered wood, and can the mind really become like dead ashes? The one who is leaning on the armrest now is not the one who was leaning on the armrest before.” Zi-Qi said, “It is surely good that you ask, Yan! Just now I lost my self (吾喪我). Did you know that? You may hear the pipes of humans but not yet the pipes of the Earth; or you may hear the pipes of the Earth but not yet the pipes of Heaven.” (何居乎? 形固可使如槁木, 而心固可使如死灰乎? 今之隱几者, 非昔之隱几者也. 子綦曰, 偽, 不亦善乎而問之也! 今者吾喪我, 汝知之乎? 女聞人籟而未聞地籟, 女聞地籟而未聞天籟夫!) (Zhuangzi, ch. 2. 齊物論)

As Zhuangzi says that “the authentic person has no self” (至人無己) in chapter one, Master ZiQi says he has lost his self (我). Kuang-ming Wu points out that in the Zhuangzi the 我 “quite
consistently means objectifiable self,” or “the self identifiable as a particular something”; the self as “completion-formation” (成); and the self that “originates division,” in particular the division between self and other (155, 185). Master Ziqi has not only lost his self (我), he has also lost his “counterpart” (耦). We can understand 耦 as the counterpart, or the other (彼) of the self (我), as Zhuangzi says that “without that/other, there is no I-self” (非彼無我, ch. 2. 齊物論). The loss of self points to the loss of the other as its counterpart. In this way the distinction between self and other is deconstructed.

“I lost my self” (吾喪我) is the beginning of a thread that goes through the entire chapter of “equalizing things,” for it means abandoning the ego-centric self, caught in one’s own prejudice, which is the source of all the disputations about right and wrong, truth and falsity, etc. (陳鼓應 1992, 131). When the objectified self is lost, then the pipes of the Earth (地籟), which were not heard before, are heard, and the true ground of human existence is revealed:

Well, the huge Clod belches out breath; it is called the wind. So long as it doesn’t come forth, (nothing happens); once it comes forth, then ten thousand (myriads) hollows rage-up howling….Mountain forest’s awe (畏) dwells in the hollows and openings of huge trees a hundred spans around, which are like noses, like mouths, like ears, like basins, like bowls, like mortars, those like pools, and those like puddles. Those turbulent, those shouting, those scolding, those inhaling, those screaming, those wailing, those moaning, those twittering; those ahead sing ‘yu----,’ and those following sing ‘yung----’; breezy wind, then a small harmony (of chorus) follows; whirling wind, then a huge harmony (of chorus) follows. When fierce wind has passed on, then multitudes of hollows are made empty (夫大塊噫氣, 其名為風. 是唯無作, 作則萬竅怒呺, …山林之畏佳, 大木百圍之竅穴, 似鼻, 似口, 似耳, 似枴, 似圤, 似臼, 似池, 似污者, 吸者, 吸者, 叼者, 畚者, 沙者, 咬者, 前者唱于而隨者唱喁. 冷風則小和, 風風則大和, 嚳風, 濟則眾竅為虚). (ch. 2. 齊物論)

When the wind/breath goes through the myriads of hollows, soundings appear. To what can these soundings be attributed, the wind, or the hollows? It is not the wind alone, nor the hollows alone. Without wind coming forth, hollows never rage-up howling. Again, without hollows (empty space), there is no way for wind to pass through. The wind has no shape, though it has substance so that it can pass through the hollows, filling them, though momentarily. On the other hand, the hollows have shapes, though they do not have substance within them, so they can allow the wind to pass through them. What makes a diversity of soundings and different harmonies are the different sizes and shapes of myriads of hollows. It is not only the hollows that make different soundings. The wind “blows on myriads not in the same way.” It blows, filling each unique hollow, and thus “lets each be itself.”

Now, which acts and which is acted on, the wind, or the hollows? Both of them act and are acted on. While the wind comes forth and passes through the hollows, at the same time it is taken and shaped while passing by different types (shapes/sizes) of hollows. While the hollows take the wind for themselves, at the same time they are moved and reshaped by different modes of wind (i.e. breezy wind, whirling wind, etc.). One can imagine the hollows/openings as myriads of spaces between leaves and branches of huge trees a hundred spans around. They have myriads of types, always changing according to how they are swayed by the wind. Thus they sometimes look “like noses, like mouths, like ears, like sockets, like bowls, like mortars, like pools, like puddles,” etc. Then, do the hollows/openings really have (fixed) shapes if they always change and are thus evasive? If any, these shapes would be momentary, not able to be captured and retained. On the other hand, does the wind really have substance? If it has, it should be able to be contained or
It would be no longer wind, however, if it does not move and thus can be contained or retained even momentarily. When the wind stops its movement, it disappears.

Both wind and hollows/openings thus have no (fixed) shape and substance. By emptying themselves, the hollows allow the wind to pass through them. By emptying itself from the space taken by itself, the wind also can move and pass through. With emptying themselves, they meet, fill, exchange, and abandon each other in the process of soundings of harmony. When they become one in the process, there occur a variety of soundings, which make various harmonies of choruses. This is what heavenly piping is like.

This music of the Earth is what is neglected in the music and rituals of the Confucians, which are instrumental in uniting/assimilating the members of society: the jade bells and drums in the “ensemble of great completions” Mencius ascribes to Confucius (Møllgaard 2007, 129). Confucius believed that music could not only harmonize human sentiments, but also bring order from social chaos (Yao 2000, 171). Zhuangzi’s pipe as music expresses the harmony of the universe, unlike instrumental music for rituals that express the order of the universe. In harmony all things are moving, interacting and equally influencing one another, and in order all things have a proper place (Confucius et al. 1938, 571). According to Zhuangzi, authentic existence is not an outer completion (成), but pure coming-into-being or life (生) itself. In Zhuangzi, the sounds of nature are the only way authentic being can articulate itself without objectifying itself in a self (我) or other/counterpart (耦) (Møllgaard 2007, 130). There is no dichotomy of subject and object between the wind and hollows: both of them are empty, but interact with each other, and from this void and total exposure in their mutual interaction emerges a fuller sense of being.

After the pipes of the Earth we hear the pipes of Heaven (天籁):

blowing at all things (myriads) not in same way, and thus letting each be itself; all of them take (it) for themselves—who is the one raging up (blowing)? (夫吹萬不同, 而使 其自已也, 咸其自取, 怒者其誰邪?) (ch. 2. 齊物論)

It is like Dao that moves, goes through all things, and lets them be themselves, but is not seen and known. Things are not the objects that are acted on by the blowing (of Dao), as they take (it) for themselves in their response to the blowing. This phrase shows a strong element of pluralism based on a profound respect for difference: Zhuangzi continually warns us about the dangers of parochialism, of imposing our own particular ways of doing things on others.

Zhuangzi’s pluralism, based on the natural process of constant change, rejects all institutional, ideological, and moral regulations, restrictions, and value systems to command, supervise, utilize, and control individuals, which he thought of as the source of misfortune in humanity. Through a variety of metaphors and parables, Zhuangzi reveals that the institutional, ideological, and moral frames constructed by the other contemporary schools, such as Confucianism, Moism, and Legalism, are oppressive devices to restrict individual freedoms, since they propagate doctrines that reflect and advocate particular concerns and interests of particular groups as the universal truth. For an effective critique of the universalism of other schools, Zhuangzi employs epistemological relativism (not philosophical relativism) to reveal the limitations of human knowledge based on limited human life experiences and intellectual capacity, in comparison to the infinite, boundless, inexhaustible, and eternal Dao that gives rise to the endless changes of all things.

Thus, we have the Confucians' and the Moists' judgment of “yes/right” (是) and “no/wrong” (非); what one calls right the other calls wrong, and what one calls wrong the other calls right. (故有儒墨之是非, 以是其所非, 而非其所是.) (ch. 2. 齊物論)
From a Zhuangzian perspective, the problem of the Confucians and Moists’ distinctions of “yes/right” (是) and “no/wrong” (非) is that they make “yes/right” what is “no/wrong” and make “no/wrong” what is “yes/right.” This identification of problems reveals how one’s distinctions/judgments can be distorted, no matter how discrete they are. Accordingly, such distinctions/judgments are easily reversed when others right their wrong and also wrong their right. Against the Confucians and the Moists’ claims, Zhuangzi says:

There is no thing which is not “that” (彼); there is no thing which is not “this/yes/right” (是); (seeing) from the position of “that” we cannot see (that); (seeing) from the position of knowing (知) it, we can know (知) it. Therefore, I say, “that” comes from “this/yes/right”; “this/yes/right” also is caused by “that”; this is the theory that that and this/yes/right give birth to each other. (物無非彼，物無非是。 自彼則不見，自知則知之。 故曰，彼出於是，是亦因彼。 彼是方生之說也。) (ch. 2. 齊物論)

The argument begins with the category of 是彼 (Shi Bi)—“this” and “that,” rather than with the category of 是非 (Shi Fei)—“yes/right” and “no/wrong.” This seems to be an intentional and strategic word choice and use, because the same word 是 means “yes/right” as an antonym to 非, meaning “no/wrong,” but also has the meaning of “this” as an antonym to 彼, meaning “that.” The effect of setting the category of 是彼 (Shi Bi), instead of 是非 (Shi Fei), is to switch the evaluative category of “right/wrong” to the demonstrative category of “this/that.” As a result, an explicit value-laden proposition can be seen as perspectival and value-neutral. In other words, “this” and “that,” like other linguistic shifting signifiers, i.e. words such as “I” and “you” and “here” and “there,” can be switched with each other on any occasion according to the position from which they are spoken. Indeed, these linguistic shifters as anonymous and empty signs that refer to the present moment of saying are appropriate in representing the reality that things are in constant change and thus are not stable objects. This is why “there are no things which are not ‘that’ (彼); there are no things which are not ‘this’ (是).” Thus, simultaneously, it can also mean that there are no things which are not “yes/right” (是).

As a result, it is not only “this” and “that,” but also “yes/right” and “no/wrong” which depend on and are subjected to a particular standpoint/perspective. One sees the opposite party in disputation as “other,” for s/he can see only from his/her own side. On the other hand, one cannot see oneself from one’s own position, which becomes a blind spot. In other words, one cannot see oneself as “other.” S/he can only be known or recognized as other by another subject. Thus, seeing “from the position of knowing” may point to knowing that reflects and includes the other’s view on oneself. In this way, each of the two parties in disputation depends on the other for recognition of themselves as other (Møllgaard 2007, 90). Likewise, the interdiffusion between the two opposites challenges the boundary and dichotomy between self and other. Zhuangzi says, “‘that’ comes from ‘this/yes/right’; ‘this/yes/right’ also is caused by ‘that,’” which is called the theory that that and this/yes/right give birth to each other (彼是方生之說) How do they give birth to each other? Their co-birthing inevitably points to paradox and reversal:

Even so, just now it is born, just now it dies; just now it dies, just now it is born; just now it is acceptable, just now it is not acceptable; just now it is not acceptable, just now it is acceptable; “this/yes/right” (是), is based on (or caused by) “no/wrong” (非), “no/wrong” (非) is based on (or caused by) “this/yes/right” (是). Therefore, the sage (聖人) does not reason (由), but illuminates (照) it in the light of heaven (天), and indeed affirms accordingly. “This/yes/right” (是) is also “that” (彼); “that” (彼) is also
“this/yes/right” (是). “That” (彼) also has one “this/yes/right” (是) and “no/wrong” (非); “this” (此) also has one “this/yes/right” (是) and “no/wrong” (非). Indeed, are there really “that” (彼) and “this/yes/right” (是)? Indeed, are there not really “that” and “this/yes/right”? When neither “that” nor “this/yes/right” (是) attains its counterpart (偶), it is called “the pivot/hinge of the Way.” The pivot/hinge begins to get the middle of its ring/circle, with which it responds endlessly. “This/yes/right” (是) also has one endlessness (無窮); “no/wrong” (非) also has one endlessness (無窮). Therefore, I say, there is no way better to brighten it. (雖然, 方生方死, 方死方生; 方可方不可, 方不可方可; 因是因非, 因非因是, 是以聖人不由, 而照之于天, 亦因是也. 是亦彼也, 彼亦是也. 彼亦一是非, 此亦一是非. 果且有彼是乎哉? 果且無彼是乎哉? 彼是莫得其偶, 諷之道樞. 橫始得其環中, 以應無窮. 是亦一無窮, 非亦一無窮也. 故曰, 莫若以明.) (ch. 2. 齊物論)

Life and death arise almost simultaneously as they alternate, and so do the “acceptable” and the “unacceptable.” It is noteworthy that Zhuangzi extends the temporality of pure emergence manifested in life and death to include propositional discourse such as “acceptable” and “unacceptable.” As he shifts the evaluative category of “right/wrong” (是非) to the demonstrative category of “this/that” (是彼) in order to reveal the arbitrary characteristics of value judgments, Zhuangzi makes a parallel between things that are subject to temporal changes and propositions that are subject to perspectival changes in order to reveal the temporality of our value judgments as well. While the discussion of “this/that” and “right/wrong” deals with the limitation of one’s perspective on value judgments, in terms of the limitation of one’s location as spatial position, the current discussion deals with that in terms of the temporality of things and perspectives that are subject to ceaseless transformations. Any judgment that is current to the moment of enunciation is subject to change as soon as the moment passes into another, just as knowledge cannot pin things down as passing and transient existence (Coutinho 2004, 172).

Therefore, it is almost impossible to make any judgment of “yes/right” and “no/wrong” (是非), good and bad (善惡), beautiful and ugly (美醜), and great and little (大小), etc. In addition, these opposites are interdependent as 非 (no/wrong) can be recognized/identified only when 是 (“yes/right”) is recognized/identified, and vice versa. Therefore, the sage does not reason, but illuminates it from heaven. To illuminate it from heaven is to see things as they are, to appreciate the pure self-emergence of things that is concealed in our deeming, reasoning, naming, and judging of them.

Thus, when illuminated from heaven, 是 (this/yes/right) is also 彼 (that), and 彼 (that) is also 是 (this/yes/right), because 彼 (that) also has one 是 (this/yes/right) and 非 (no/wrong), and 此 (this) also has one 是 (this/yes/right) and 非 (no/wrong). Here, an interesting combination of word choices highlights the interchangeability between this and that, or between yes/right and no/wrong. While 是 (yes/no; right/wrong) is a word pair commonly used for the distinction of yes/no or right/wrong in the situation of argument, 彼此 (that/this) also is a word pair commonly used to refer to the counterparts in pairs engaged in dialogue or discussion. Thus, it would be more common to say, 此 (this) is also 彼 (that), and 彼 (that) is also 此 (this), rather than saying, 是 (this/yes/right) is also 彼 (that), and 彼 (that) is also 是 (this/yes/right).

The reason why 是 is used at the beginning instead of 此 becomes clear in the next sentence, where 彼 also has one 是 and 此 also has one 是. An ironic implication would be that, 彼 (that) also has both 是 (this/yes/right) and 非 (not-this/no/wrong), and 此 (this) also has both 是 (this/yes/right) and 非 (not-this/no/wrong). If one takes not-this as that, it would mean that that also has both this and that, and this also has both this and that. In this way, “this” and “that,” used
here as linguistic signifiers (empty signs) representing the pairs of binary opposites, interpenetrate each other. According to this logic, life already has death in it, and vice versa, and it is the same with other dichotomies, such as right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable, having and lacking, preservation and loss, failure and success, poverty and wealth, worthiness and unworthiness, slander and fame, beauty and ugliness, emptiness and fullness, greatness and littleness, completion and impairment, etc. Likewise, the permeability of boundaries and the mutual interpenetration of opposites allow us to make sense of much of Zhuangzi’s contradictory shifei (是非) talk, without having to interpolate reference to points of view, that is, without resorting to imposing on Zhuangzi unstated doctrines of relativism or skepticism (Coutinho 2004, 178).

Are (not) there really “that” and “this”? Such a state in which none of “that” and “this/yes/right” gets its counterpart (as opposite) is called 道樞, Dao Pivot/Hinge. When the pivot/hinge responds endlessly by occupying the middle of its ring/circle, both “this/yes/right” and “no/wrong” alternate endlessly. The endless responses of Dao Pivot allow no fixed standpoint from which to view things as “yes/right” or “no/wrong.”

Then, what makes some “acceptable” and others “unacceptable”? What makes things “so”? Zhuangzi’s answer is that “because things are called so, they are so” (物謂之而然) (ch. 2. 齊物論). Things can be acceptable by our calling them “can be acceptable,” and they cannot be acceptable by our calling, that is, labeling them “cannot be acceptable” (可乎可, 不可乎不可) (ch. 2. 齊物論). In the same way a road is made by people walking on it (道行之而成) (ch. 2. 齊物論). Seen from Dao Pivot/Hinge, however, there is no division/distinction between “so” and “not-so,” or between “acceptable” and “unacceptable.” Rather, things are what are inherently so, and things are what can inherently be acceptable (物固有所然, 物固有所可) (ch. 2. 齊物論). For there are no things that are not so, and there are no things that cannot be acceptable (無物不然, 無物不可) (ch. 2. 齊物論).

This is an affirmation of transcending the dichotomy between affirmation and negation. It is a radical affirmation of all things, rather than an irresponsible indifference to reality based on skeptical relativity, as long as it challenges the roads of conventions (因習) that people have made by walking on them, and thus affirms the possibility of all imaginable or even unimaginable roads. It is only conventions that make such value-laden judgments and label things. It is not a coincidence, then, that Zhuangzi’s “sages” and “teachers” are depicted as ugly, repulsive, and irreverent—anything but noble and dignified; they are depicted as unconventional (Berling 1985, 105).

Zhuangzi’s “discussion about equalizing things” (齊物論) ends with the most famous story of Zhuangzhou (Zhuangzi’s personal name) and Butterfly, where one subject fluctuates between two identities or different species. However, are they really two identities and different species? The story is as follows:

Once, Zhuang-zhou dreamed, becoming a butterfly. Flitting, flitting, as such, he/it is a butterfly. Telling/informing/enlightening itself/himself, it/he goes with intent. It/he does not know (it/he is) Zhou. Suddenly he awoke. Then, thoroughly, thoroughly, as such, he is Zhou. He does not know—Zhou’s dream makes the butterfly? Or the butterfly’s dream makes Zhou? Between Zhou and Butterfly, there must be, then, a division/distinction. This, we call it “things changing/transforming.” (昔者莊周夢為胡蝶, 楚楚然胡蝶也, 自喻適志與! 不知周也. 俄然覺, 則蘧蘧然周也. 不知周之夢為胡蝶與, 蝴蝶之夢為周與? 周與胡蝶, 則必有分矣. 此之謂物化.) (ch. 2. 齊物論)
How does one know who s/he is? Butterfly (in the dream of Zhou), though it/he is Zhou, does not know (it/he is) Zhou. Then, how can Zhou (in the dream of Butterfly), though he/it is Butterfly, know (he/it is) Butterfly? How can one know if it is a dream/sleep or a waking/awakening? The incompatible alternatives (dream/sleep and waking/awakening; Zhou and Butterfly) are equally weighted in the story, since no one knows for certain which is dreaming. Thus it deconstructs conventions that unbalance things, where waking is given more weight than dream, and Zhou (human) is given more weight than Butterfly (other species). The story goes beyond a transposition of things, which only switch their locations/standpoints while still keeping their fixed identities; it points to an interchange and transformation of things which makes their identities fluctuate endlessly. As a result, it deconstructs the dichotomy of the subject and the object because not only are both Zhou and Butterfly subjects, but also they are virtually one subject that fluctuates between alternative realms, whether it is Zhou, or Butterfly, who dreams.

However, Zhuangzi does not miss the point that “there must be a division/distinction” between Zhou and Butterfly, for they do not have the same identity. They are two different entities that replace and transform into each other, but constitute one subject. They live at the same time in different ways, one dreaming and the other waking, and vice versa. In any case, one cannot eliminate the other and the difference/otherness between them in the realization of its life. If the other does not dream, one cannot be wakened and vice versa. In this way, the identity of the subject cannot be determined: it cannot be one of the two, or both of them at the same time, much less neither of them.

Likewise, an authentic subject forgets “self” to find and live “other” within itself. It has no self-contained identity, for it is already imbued with “other.” This cohabitation of self and other in a subject, and the indeterminacy of its self-identity represent the grammar of Dao. Zhuangzi calls such an event taking place in the grammar of Dao, “transformation of things” (物化), which is the word that ends the entire chapter. In this way, the chapter opening with the story of “I lost myself” (吾喪我) and ending with the word “transformation of things” (物化), unfolds the dialectic of self and other, and the two metaphors constitute the beginning and the end of the thread of the equalization of all things. In the middle we find another metaphor of “Dao Pivot/Hinge” (道樞) that points to the standpoint of Dao, the great equalizer, which is never fixed, with endless responses to ever alternating “yes/right” (是) and “no/wrong” (非). The “loss of self” (喪我) deconstructs self-centered prejudice that causes the disputes of 是非. The “Dao Pivot/Hinge” (道樞) deconstructs in the disputes any fixed standpoints from “this/self” and “that/other” that assume their solid self-identities. In the end, the “transformation of things” (物化) deconstructs any fixed identity through the dialectic of self and other that have equal value. All three metaphors serve the “equalization of things” (齊物).

Zhuangzi as Alternative Recourse for Asian Feminists

Women’s lives in most parts of Asia have been influenced by the imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and post-colonialism that entailed modernization, economic exploitation, and political dictatorship throughout modern history. The imperial powers most relevant to and responsible for the colonial history of most parts of Asia are the United States, China, and Japan. In the modern history of imperialism and colonialism, Americans, Chinese, and Japanese defined themselves as exceptional and as the embodiment of civilization. One of the ways to reinforce the claim of superiority is to define the Other, those beyond the boundaries, as barbarians and savages. This boundary-making between self and the Other—that is, defining who “We” are by emphasizing those who are “not-Us”—as a basic device on which nationalism relies, also creates
and reinforces the othering of all minority groups and citizens, including women, even within the nation-state.

The Chinese worldview was the most coherently realized conception of such a scheme, relegating peoples living beyond the reach of the Confucian system and culture to the outer ring of barbarians (夷), fit to be ruled by force rather than by moral persuasion. Even though the Japanese culture incorporated Confucian ideology, the Chinese still considered the Japanese inferior. China had long defined its identity as an empire by its centrality in the universal order and its superior relationship to the surrounding barbarians. Japan had its own version of the Chinese order, in which various lesser peoples, from the Ainus and Ryukuans, and later its backward Asian neighboring countries, to the Chinese themselves, were the foil against which Japanese civilization and modernity was defined (Chin 2010, 43).

For Americans, this habit of superiority originated in the Protestant ideology of chosen-ness. Civilization requires barbarians. For early American colonists, native Americans were viewed as the savages surrounding the English settlements, while by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Americans began to see the whole world as a target for spreading the American way of life. Moreover, Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often used Asia as a foil for their notion of civilization, weighing China and Japan against each other (21-22). The Chinese worldview of Confucianism, the American worldview of Christianity and Western modernity, and the Japanese worldview of the combination of Confucianism and Western modernity, which they adopted from China and America, all share imperial schemes and ideologies. In the process of modernization in Asia, these imperial worldviews not only conflicted with, but also intersected and combined with one another. For instance, Korea, which has been under the influence of all three imperial powers through its modern colonial history, ended up with the combination of Confucian, Christian, and Western modern worldviews, and this combination has obstructed Korean women’s liberation.

As the Confucian and Western modern worldviews and their combinations, which were instrumental to the imperial powers, influenced many parts of Asian countries, a strategy for Asian women’s movements would be to deconstruct those worldviews and find an alternative to them. Confucianism was the dominant school of thought and orthodox ideology for most of two thousand years, and thus underlined the basic structure of society and community in most parts of East Asia (Yao 2000, 31-32). In addition, it is agreed among scholars in Confucian Studies that while the social structure of imperial Confucianism has long been demolished, its doctrinal and idealistic values remain inherent in Chinese psychology and underlie East Asian peoples’ attitudes and behavior (Tu 1996, 259; Kim 1996, 203).

One of the reasons why Confucianism continues to have such an influence is that Confucianism has been utilized not only as a social system, but also as ideology and culture through education and religious rites. Laws and regulations change more often and have power only while they are effective, but rituals and culture have more durability, resisting changes. It is ritual/propriety (禮) as the embodiment of the Confucian ideology of morality that made the people obedient to the political authority in the regions that adopted Confucianism as orthodox ideology. 礼 is a political, social, cultural, and ethical system and ideology that subjects the will and purpose of individuals to that of the collective (이숙인 1997, 193). 礼 in pair with 樂 (music) constitutes a political theory in Confucianism, as recorded in The Record of Rites (禮記):

Music is to create unity; Ritual is to make a distinction. Unity brings mutual affection; distinction brings mutual respect….The establishment of ritual and righteousness brings the ranking of the noble and the mean; the unity through music and culture brings harmony between high and low. (樂者為同, 禮者為異. 同則相親, 異則相敬…禮義立, 則貴賤等矣, 樂文同, 則上下和矣.) (The Record of Rites, 礼记)
In this way, the function of 禮 is to differentiate low from high while that of 樂 is to assimilate the ruled to the superior. In short, 禮樂 as a political theory is a controlling device with which to prevent the conflicts between high and low through the function of 樂, unity/harmony, while keeping social hierarchy through that of 禮, control/regulation (The Record of Rites, 樂記). Thus, the theory of 禮樂 was utilized for political and social stability through the logic of “difference” and “sameness” which are made to be “discrimination” and “uniformity.”

In this way, the function of 禮 as a controlling device has much resonance with that of nationalism as a production of Western modernity, and a boundary-making system which serves to create and control citizens and non-citizens/minorities through the differentiation/exclusion and assimilation/subsumption of “the other.” Against the Confucian pursuit of “uniformity” and “assimilation” through ritual music, Zhuangzi presented Heavenly piping, natural music, blowing on myriads not in the same way, and thus letting each be itself, creating a variety of soundings that ever pass and change every moment, and rendering each no fixed self-identity or social roles. Zhuangzi offered alternative metaphors of 道樞 (Dao Pivot/Hinge) and 物化 (Transformation of Things), in which things, including binary opposites, are interdependent with and transferable to each other with equal values; thus difference cannot be the basis of discrimination and equality cannot require uniformity.

What underlies the Confucian system of 禮 is the ideology of “social harmony” (調和), utilized for political and social stability based on hierarchical order. 調和 requires every individual to know the place assigned to him/her and play the part assigned to him/her in the hierarchically ranked social order, as represented by the Five Cardinal Relationships. In terms of gender politics, 調和 requires women’s sacrifices and concessions based on the logic of “difference/distinction” and “sameness/assimilation” that justifies the distinction of the roles between men and women as the condition of social harmony/unity. The Confucian way of distinguishing between the ruler and the ruled—characterized by teaching and bestowing favor on the part of the ruler and learning and being loyal to the ruler on the part of the ruled—is also applied to the division of the roles between men and women: men teach and bestow favor, and women learn and are obedient to men. Likewise, the issue of women’s discrimination in the Confucian tradition derives from the characteristic of giving priority to the collective over individuals, as represented by the system of ritual/propriety (禮) and the ideology of “social harmony” (調和) which seek moral and cultural conformity.

During the Korean modernization period, this collectivism rooted in the Confucian tradition was affirmed and reinforced by Korean nationalism as “community consciousness,” and as an essence of Korean identity in contradistinction to the “Western identity” based on individualism. Furthermore, the nationalist discourse represented “Western individualism” in relation to pursuits of selfish interests, and praised the Korean collective orientation grounded primarily in Confucian social relations (Moon 1998, 48). As women’s issues in Asia derive in general from the tradition of giving priority to collectivity, feminism in some part of Asia has drawn on individualism, rooted in modern Western thought, as an alternative model for women’s movements in seeking women’s independence.

However, feminism based on individualism is very limiting in terms of the issue of women’s agency when it attempts to establish women as subjects with autonomy, independence, and reason—the values represented by the male subjects of Western modernity—and means that the goal is to replace the male subject of reason with a female one. Feminist intellectuals (with a few exceptions) have tended to argue for the necessity of some of those great modernist values (Nicholson 1990). From Plato through Descartes to Kant and Hegel, mainstream Western philosophy thematizes the story of the male subject of reason (Benhabib 1995, 19). As long as the
ideal subject, while being purported to be neutral and universal, represents male standards and values for humanity, replacing the male subject with the female requires the female subject to be assimilated with the ideal of humanity based on male standards and values. Even the ideal of equality and freedom in the Enlightenment often functioned as a device to universalize the bourgeois ideology of universal humanity that at the same time marginalized those who remained outside its standards or the categories of humanity. Within this framework of universality, the feminists’ search for equality means the approval of the standard-status of the universal subject to which they seek to be equal, which means they want to resemble or be assimilated to the modern subject.

Therefore, any claim for the universal and self-identical subject, either male or female, which homogenizes humanity and obliterates differences, serves to delegitimize the presence of otherness and differences which do not fit into its categories. For instance, as Black feminists expose the white prism through which the category “woman” has been constructed by White feminists, and as lesbians and disabled feminists challenge the conventional construction of womanhood, the false universalism of womanhood that represents all women obliterates differences of race, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation or bodily impairment (Lister 1997, 72-74). This universalization of women also entails the homogenization of groups regarded as “other,” for instance in the creation of “a composite, singular ‘third-world’ woman” who is denied all agency (Mohanty 1991, 53). It is often a dominant social group that attaches the mantle of universalism to its specific experiences, perspectives, understandings, interests, ethics, ideologies, and institutions, reducing those of subordinate groups to “special” cases (Moon 2005, 121). In this way, universalism is used to create, conceal and perpetuate discrimination between the center and the periphery.

A sense of genuine universal humanity and its vision of homogeneity that makes multiplicity look chaotic and troublesome are shared by both modern Western humanism and Confucian humanism. Universalism found in both these traditions functions as an ideological device that orders differences hierarchically against a privileged singular standard. In particular, the universalization of humanity as the male subject both in Confucianism and Western modernity creates and conceals women’s discrimination/alienation. Hence, feminist claims for equality based on the universality of humanity such as the Enlightenment ideal of human dignity and equality cannot achieve their goal within the ideological frame in which humanity is understood as a male property. Within that frame, equality requires women to be like men. However, true equality can be guaranteed by the respect for difference/particularity, not by the assimilation of difference/particularity into uniformity/universality.

As long as the false universalism and the dichotomy of subject and object remains, replacing the existing subject with another cannot be a fundamental solution, as the new subject will continue to participate in the system of objectifying anything categorized as “other.” The problem is that any independent subject separated from the world as the object signifies “domination” in the name of achievements and advances through the apparatus of rationality, knowledge, standards, and truth (of particular class/groups) to be universalized and imposed on others. Hence, a fundamental solution should be found in deconstructing the hierarchical frameworks of universalism and the dichotomy of subject and object, which create otherness and discriminate differences. For the task of overcoming these hierarchical frameworks, Zhuangzi’s worldview as interpreted in this article can be a useful resource to draw on.

In contrast to the dualistic tradition with its long history in the West—the dualism of form and idea, essence and phenomenon, source and individual entity, body and spirit, reason and sense/emotion, and so on, of which the relation is always interpreted in terms of religious, ethical, political meaning/value of hierarchy, Zhuangzi wholeheartedly rejected such hierarchical dualism. In Zhuangzi things (including opposites) are always in the process of change, characterized by interdependence and mutual transformation that makes no hierarchy between them. Indeed, Dao (道) and Qi (気), through which all things are generated, changed, and connected, transcend the
evaluative dichotomy of good and bad, or right and wrong. The subject/self in Zhuangzi is characterized by the multiple and fluid identities always “becoming” in the process of the constant interaction with others, the world, rather than “being” independent from them. In this way, the binary opposition between the subject and object is deconstructed.

The subject as represented by Confucian humanism, which emphasizes social relations based on hierarchical structures, demands that social minorities, including women, be subjected to the collectivity, that is, family, society, and state. On the other hand, the subject as represented by modern Western humanism, which emphasizes independence based on reason and the dichotomy of subject/object, obliterates or objectifies social minorities, including women. Both Confucian humanism and modern Western humanism are characterized by the construction of identity achieved through the inscription of boundaries that demarcate and denigrate differences from the universal subject, set up as the standard. In contrast, Zhuangzi’s thought of the mutual dependence of opposites on equal terms reveals that identity/self is constituted in relation to difference/other, and claims that there is no hierarchy between opposites, between the identity/self and difference/other, and thus negates the claim that identity/self has the standard by which difference/other is to be differentiated from and at the same time assimilated to identity/self.

Identity has been conventionally understood within the West as an essential, authentic core of experience (Minh-ha 1998, 71-78). The concept of fixed identity/subject, which is also reflected in the feminist search for the “real me” in the early 1970s, implies the fictive unity of the self and essentialism (Hall 1992, 276). Such an essentialist understanding of identity is a basis of modern Western thought on humanity as an individual entity separated and differentiated from the world. The separation of a subject from the world points to the dichotomy between self/subject/humanity and other/object/nature. The essentialized difference and dichotomy between male and female is based on such a dualist and essentialist understanding of the fixed self that is separated from “other.”

The essentialist understanding of fixed identity is also found in the Confucian worldview that emphasizes “distinction-making” (辨/別) in things; titles; social classes and roles; and ethical duties, by giving them the correct names and definitions according to the fixed identities of those things which make them to be themselves. Underlying this worldview is the idea that we can gain epistemic access to essences, that is, we can give correct names corresponding to what it is. In contrast, according to Zhuangzi, it is not only that we have no epistemic access to the reality of things, but also that there is no such thing as essence not subject to change. For we are creatures of becoming in a world of becoming; we are finite temporal beings with finite temporal capacities; things are always changing, understandings are always developing; change as a process of recreation includes the anomaly, the irregularity, or the unanticipated case. Zhuangzi negates the idea of the self as a fixed identity separated from others or the world. There is no essence that makes an individual entity what it is, for all things in the world are composed of one qi, the inseparable one moving through all things.

The distinction between the roles of men and women in Confucianism is based on the idea that there is an ontological and essential difference between men and women. In Zhuangzi, however, there is no essential difference between women and men or between humanity and other creatures as all of them are generated by Dao, which transforms and equalizes things. The Confucian theory of “social harmony” is an ideological device to conceal the power relations in the positions and roles assigned to men and women, which requires women’s concessions, conformity, and sacrifices. Hence, for Asian feminists, Confucian relationality, based on essentially differentiated fixed roles to serve collectivity, cannot be an alternative to individualism rooted in modern Western thought.

In Zhuangzi, those in the lower classes of the society, such as artisans, farmers, and merchants, are not only valued; they teach the nobles and superiors, reversing the social roles assigned in the society where the nobles and superiors are supposed to teach the lower classes.
terms of transferability of social roles, there is no exception in gender roles. For instance, the story of Liezi (列子) is introduced as an exemplar for returning to an ideal way of life, in which he cooks for his wife and feed the pigs as if he were feeding people (Zhuangzi, ch. 7. 应帝王). In that sense, Zhuangzi’s relationality, where the related parties are open to the possibility of change, affected by each other on equal terms, and their roles are equally valued and transferable according to circumstances, can be an alternative both to the collectivism rooted in the Confucian tradition and to the individualism rooted in modern Western thought.

Conclusion

As illuminated in the interpretation of the “discussion about equalizing things,” employing various metaphors, such as the “loss of self” (喪我), the “Dao Pivot/Hinge” (道樞), and the “transformation of things” (物化), Zhuangzi exposes the limitation of prejudiced self-centeredness and deconstructs the false conception of fixed identity through the dialectic of self and other that have equal value. Thus Zhuangzi’s paths to the “equalization of things” (齊物) are found in his radical pluralism based on the respect for difference and otherness, and in an alternative identity politics based on interdependence and mutual transformation between things, which deconstructs the dichotomy of the subject/self/human and the object/other/nature. Therefore, Zhuangzi’s subversive wisdom provides useful insights for Asian feminists who seek an alternative strategy to deconstruct the modern Western and Confucian frames of essentialist, universalistic, and hierarchical understandings of humanity, and the world that continues to create and marginalize “the Other,” including women.

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